We are obliged to use official statistical data, because federal victimologi-cal survey is absent. Official police crime statistics are not reliable. The correct number and rates of crime are much more than the official statistical data in all countries. But since 1993-1994 there is mass cover-up of crimes that are not being registered (Gavrilov, 2001; Gilinskiy, 2002: 46-48; Luneev, 1997: 145). For example, the clearance rate in Russia is almost impossible to achieve (table 1). The data of murders cept by medical departments (World Health Statistics, 1996) are more reliable than police data (1992 – 22.9 and 15.5; 1993 – 30.4 and 19.6; 1994 – 32.3 and 21.8).

The trend of registered crimes from 1985 till 2002 is presented in tables 2. 3, 4. The main tendencies are as follows:

• The rate (per 100,000 inhabitants) of registered crime decreased in 1986-1988 (time of Gorbachev's Perestroika), increased from 817 (1987) to 1863 in 1995 and, after a short period (1996-1998), increased to 2051.4 in 1999.

• The rate (per 100,000 inhabitants) of murders (including attempted murders) decreased in 1986-1988 (to 6.3 in 1987), increased from 6.3 in 1987 to 21.8 in 1994 and, after a short time period, went down in 1995-1997, and increased to 22-23 in 2001-2003.

• The dynamic in the rate of others crime is analogous – minimum during Gorbachev's period, increased in 1994-1995, transitory cutting down and increased again in 1998-2003. The process of lowering of the crime rate was due to the „Thaw“ of Khrushchev too.

The rate of violence is very high in Russia. The official rate (per 100,000 populations) of homicide increased from 6.6 in 1987 to 23.1 in 2001, and more than 22 in 2002-2003. By comparison, the rate of homicide on average per year in 1999-2001 was: Australia – 1.9; Austria – 1.2; Finland – 2.8; France – 1.7; Germany – 1.1; Japan – 1.0; Netherlands – 1.5; Norway – 0.9; Poland – 2.0; Spain – 1.1; Sweden – 1.1; USA – 5.6 (Barclay and Tavares, 2003: 10).

The rate of grievous bodily harm increased in Russia from 13.9 in 1987 up to 39.9 in 2003 (45.7 in 1994).

There are many causes of violence in Russia. The main ones are as following:

• The geographical factor. Russia is very large country. Russian people had the power to conquer, establishing their power over larger territories.

• The historical factor, including the Byzantine heritage and the Soviet regime. For example, the Byzantine bishops persuaded Russian Prince Vladimir to put the death penalty into operation.

• The political factor. Russia has never been a democratic state, and never experienced the rule of law. Instead, it has experienced a centuries-long tradition of despotism and totalitarianism. The extent of repressing the people in the Soviet period could be compared with genocide. The Soviet regime killed more 61.9 million people from 1917 to 1987 (Kressel, 1996).

• The economic factor. The Russian people have always been poor. Considerable social and economic inequality always existed in Russia. The constantly growing economic polarization of the contemporary population – visible in the stark contrast between the poor majority and the nouveau rich minority (the «New Russian») – is a long-term source of continuing social conflict, envy, and violence.

• The cultural factor. Historical, political, and economic factors helped form Russian culture and mentality which is repressive and intolerant, with a tradition of violence. Russian proverbs attest to it, and popular tales reflect it.

• The juridical factor. Contemporary criminal legislation and practice of the police, the judiciary, and prisons are very strict and repressive, including use of mass torture. Violence gives rise to more violence.

Table 1. Detection of Crime (in %) in Russia (1992-2003)

Source: Crime and Delinquency. Statistical Review. Annual. Moscow: MVD RF, MJ RF; State of Crime in Russia. Annual. Moscow: MVD RF.

Table 2. Dynamic of the rates (per 100 000 inhabitants) of General Crime in Russia (1985-2003)

Source: Crime and Delinquency. Statistical Review. Annual. Moscow: MVD RF, MJ RF; State of Crime in Russia. Annual. Moscow: MVD RF.

Table 3. Rate (per 100 000 inhabitants) of Serious Violent Crimes in Russia (1985-2003)

Source: Crime and Delinquency. Statistical Review. Annual. Moscow: MVD RF, MJ RF; State of Crime in Russia. Annual. Moscow: MVD RF.

Table 4. Rate (per 100 000 inhabitants) of Crimes Against Property in Russia (1985-2003)

Source: Crime and Delinquency. Statistical Review. Annual. Moscow: MVD RF, MJ RF; State of Crime in Russia. Annual. Moscow: MVD RF.

 

Drug abuse

The real situation of drug use and drug addicts is not known. The official data of drug-related crime is presented in tables 5. We can see that this rate increased from 8.6 in 1988 up to 167.3 in 2000 and decreased to 126.9 in 2003.

The official rate of drug and heavy substance users in Russia increased from 25.7 in 1985 up to 195.7 in 1998. The official rate of drug addicts increased from 1.3 in 1980 to 31.0 in 1997 (Human Development Report in the Russian Federation, 1999: 69). Most of offenders of drug-related crime (80-90 %) were convicted for actions without intention to sell (table 6). Consequently, the «war on drugs» is a «war on drugs users»… The Russian drug police is ineffective and there is extensive drug trafficking (Gilinskiy, Zazulin, 2001; Paoli, 2001).

 

Organized crime

There are too many definitions of organized crime (Abadinsky, 1994; Alba-nese, 1995; Arlacchi, 1986; and others). We will use the definition of organized crime as the functioning of stable, hierarchical associations, engaged in crime as a form of business, and setting up a system of protection against public control by means of corruption.

Organized crime is not only sum of criminal organizations. It is a complicated social phenomenon, which has an influence on the economy and the policy of states. The growth of the organizational aspect of crime is a natural, objective process; it is a manifestation of the growth of the organizational aspect of the social systems as well as of the sub-systems (the economy, politics, etc.). It is a global, world wide process.

Table 5. Rate (per 100.000 inhabitants) of Drug-Related Crimes in Russia (1990-2003)

Source: Crime and Delinquency. Statistical Review. Annual. Moscow: MVD RF, MJ RF. State of Crime in Russia. Annual. Moscow: MVD RF.

Table 6. Convicts for Drug-Related Crimes in Russia (1989-2001)

Source: Crime and Delinquency. Statistical Review. Annual. Moscow: MVD RF, MJ RF

Criminal business arises, exists and develops due to by certain conditions:

• Demand for illegal wares (drugs, arms, etc.) and services (sexual, etc.)

• Dissatisfied demand for legal wares and services (for example, total deficit in USSR)

• Unemployment and others sources of indigency as social basis of deviance, including criminality

• Defects in tax-policy, customs policy of state, etc.

The high degree of adaptability of criminal associations (resulting from their strict labor discipline, their careful selection of staff, the high profits, etc.) ensure their great vital capacity («Mafia is immortal!»). For example, the Russian criminal organizations recruit only the youngest, bravest, and the most enterprising persons.

Contemporary organized crime in Russia began during the 1970-1990 period; that was when some kind of contact was established and collaborations initiated between traditional white-collar criminals, corrupt part functionaries, and the criminals, including old «thieves-in-law» and the new generation of «bandits» or «sportsmen». This new generation of bandits is made up of young men who were not in the criminal population during the Soviet regime, and, who at the collapse of the Soviet Union, joined some former KGB elements in organized crime and commiying all kinds of vices. Criminals of the new generation shoved energy, activity, and cruelty in deciding a conflict situation that has allowed it to quickly occupy a place under the sun in the criminal world. Contemporary organized crime is a result of this process of amalgamation of the old «thieves-in-law» and «tsekhoviki» (shady operators) with new «bandits» and corrupt representatives of power structures, oriented to the pursuit of heightened levels of illegal (or legal or semi-legal) profit.

The Russian criminal organizations have differently dimensions, organization structure, and specialization, but are united in illegal (criminal) enterprise. The main fields of activity of criminal organizations in Russia are bank speculations (shady transaction), fictitious real estate transaction, stealing and reselling cars, illegal export of non-ferrous metals, production of and traffic in fake hard liquor, arms sales, control over gambling, agencies for supplying sexual service, drug trafficking, and laundering money (Gilinskiy, 2003: 146-164).

 

Corruption

There are too many definitions of corruption. Perhaps the shortest (and precise) definition is: «the abuse of public power for private profit» (Joseph Senturid). The UNO offers as analogous definition (Resolution 34/169 of the General Assembly UNO, 12.17.1979).

There are too many forms (manifestations) of corruption: bribery, favoritism, nepotism, protectionism, lobbying, illegal distribution and redistribution of public resources and funds, theft of treasury, illegal privatization, illegal ability to finance of political structures, extortion, allowance of favorable credit (contracts), buying of votes, the famous Russian «blat» (different services for relatives, friends, acquaintances) (Ledeneva, 1998), etc.

Corruption is a complicated social phenomenon. It is an element of relations of economic exchange (brokers). It is a type (manifestation) of venality at the same kind as marriage swindlers and prostitution (the venality of spirit or body), and it exists in societies of commodity and pecuniary circulation.

Corruption is a social construction (Berger, Luckmann, 1967). Society determines (constructs): what, where, when, and by which conditions some action is labeled as «corruption», «crime», «prostitution» and so on.

Corruption is a social institution (Timofeev, 2000). It is a constituent element of of the system of management and government. Corruption is a social institution for the following reasons:

• Corruption carries out some social functions: simplifying of administrative relations; acceleration of administrative decisions; consolidation and restructuring of relations between the social classes or strata; aiding economic development by decreasing government regulation; trigger optimization of the economy when there is a deficit of resources; etc. (Leffi 1964; Scott, 1972; and other).

• Process of corruption involves the action of certain persons: the bribe-taker, briber (suborner), and mediator (go-between). There are relations of «patron – client» between them. They play certain social parts.

• There are certain rules (norms) of play, and the partners know these rules.

• Certain slangs and symbols exist (for example, to express a bribe in Russia, you rub three fingers: the thumb, middle finger and forefinger).

• There are certain fixed prices (tariff). Some of these fixed prices in Russia were published in the Russian press.

There is corruption in all countries. It is a worldwide problem. But the dimensions of corruption are diverse. Corruption, common in Russia, has taken on a grand scale in all the organs of power and official establishments. The damage from corruption is about $ 20-25 billion per year. The export of capital from Russia abroad amounts to $ 15-25 billion per year. Every day, the Russian and foreign Mass Media reveal facts of Russian corruption and corrupt activities. Corruption in contemporary Russia is an element of the political system, and a mechanism of the political regime. There are large corruption networks, including ministries, the police, the FSB (former KGB), and so on (Satarov, 2002; Sungurov, 2000).

Russia has various typologies of corruption, namely, «white», «grey», and «black» corruption (Heidenheimer, Johnston, Le Vine, 1989). Russian corruption is becoming more and more common, because the tolerance of corruption is growing by leaps and bounds.

Corruption, including taking of bribes, is a very latent phenomenon. And official, registered data (see table 7) most probably shows police action than depict reality.

Table 7. Bribery in Russia (1987-2001)

Source: Crime and Delinquency. Statistical Review. Annual. Moscow: MVD RF, MJ RF.

 

Victims

The number of the victims in contemporary Russia is huge. The number of persons on death row in Russia is high. Table 7 shows number of persons on death row in Russia each year, from 1987 to 2001.

Latent criminality is high. A national victimological survey is absent, but there are local studies. Our victimological study in St. Petersburg (1999-2002) shows that:

• There is stable share of victims from St. Petersburg's citizens: 26.5 % in 1999; 27.0 % in 2000; 25.9 % in 2001; and 26.1 % in 2002.

• 28-36 % respondents of all victims were victims more than once (two and more times) a year.

• There is a stable share of victims, who did not report to the police: 70.3 % in 1999; 69.2 % un 2000; 73.7 % in 2001; and 73.5 % in 2002.

• Reasons for refusing to report are: «nothing would be done» in 35-38 %; «police could not do anything» in 17-19 %; «did not want to have contact with police» said another 7-8%; «injury was insignificant or there was no injury» claimed 26-32 %, etc.

• Reaction of police when crime was reported: «did not react at all» said 12-18 %; «a long time afterward, they took action» claimed 5-8%; and «do not know anything about actions of police» insisted 11-15 % (!). Police reaction was immediately only for 29-38 % of the victims.

Similar results were observed in the city of Volgograd and the town of Borowitchy (2001). The study shows that the Russian people do not set informal wedges against crimes and police activity is low.

Table 8. Number on Death Row (1987-2001)

Source: Crime and Delinquency. Statistical Review. Annual. Moscow: MVD RF, MJ RF.

 

Police

The police force in Russia, known as the Militia, was set up a month after the state coup of October 1917 and it continues as the Militia to this day. The entire Militia in Russia is under the direction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as are the internal army and specialized forces (railroad, air and river militia). The penitentiary service was transferred in 1998 to the Ministry of Justice, the fire safety service is transferred now to the Ministry of Extraordinary Situations.

The Militia in the republics are directed by the republican Ministry of Internal Affairs, and in each territory, region, city or district, they are directed by the main board of internal affairs, as established by the Constitution and law of each region.

The current directives, functions, and structure of the Militia are laid down in the Russian legislation, «On the Militia», passed on April 18, 1991 (with some modifications).

The Militia is organized into two main sub-divisions: the Criminal Militia and the Militia for Civil Safety (or Public Order) at the local level (Law «On the Militia for Civil Safety», 1993). The Criminal Militia include the detective service, the economic crime prevention service, scientific/technical specialists, operational investigators, and others who supply material for criminal investigation. The Civil Militia include the duty service, the service for securing civil order, the state automobile inspectorate, the security service, divisional inspectors, temporary detention guards, the prevention service, and others. The Criminal Investigation Service is a separate unit under the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Gilinskiy, 2000: 173-194).

There are different data about the numbers of Russian Militia: the Militia forces stood at about 540,000, and that of the internal army at about 278,000 in 1995 (Everyone's Newspaper, 1995, N 51); the police rate per 100,000 population in Russian Federation was 1224.58 in 1994 (Newman, 1999: 124); staff of the Ministry of Internal Affairs RF were about 1.5 million in 1996 (Corruption and Combat Corruption, 2000: 29).

There are different training and education systems for the various police staff in Russia: private (soldier) or officer, investigator or inspector, etc. There are six main kinds of police training – common education (school, college, university) plus special training; elementary special training for privates; common higher (including juridical) education; special police education; the system of raising the level of one's skill; the Academy of Management of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) for the senior and the highest commanding staff.

There are two main kinds of regulations of the police training and education – Law on Education (1996), Law on Higher and Post-graduated Professional Education (1996) and different police orders (statutes, instructions, etc.). All educational programs must correspond to state (public) standards of the Ministry of Education. All training programs must correspond to orders of the MIA.

Staff of teachers is very heterogeneous. Experienced officers teach in the police school (educational centers) for privates. Experienced officers and some university teachers teach in police colleges and police higher courses. University professors, readers, and lectures teach in police universities and academies.

There is an exchange of experience between teachers of Russian police universities, policemen and foreign colleagues. The Russian police universities organize different joint international seminars and conferences. Some foreign educational institutions send books and equipment to Russian universities and colleges. Russian police officers have gon abroad for police training to Denmark, Finland, Germany, and the USA.

Training and education plans of Russian universities of the MIA include programs on international human rights standards. Some universities of the MIA have arrangements for training personal assigned to the UN peacekeeping mission (for example, the Rostov's University for the mission in Bosnia).

Police as well as police training and education system are part and parcel of the society, and they have common problems – economic, social, political, morale (including insufficient of finances, corruption, traditional Russian police «secrecy», the militarization of police, and police training, etc.).

 

Punishment

The social control over deviance (including criminality) is one of the major problems in the modern world. Street crime, organized crime, violent crime, terrorism, and so on, affect people and give rise to «moral panic» and «fear to crime» (Cohen, 1973). Legislators, politicians, police and criminal justice officials try, often habitually, repressive methods to gain control over criminality, drug abuse and drug trafficking, prostitution, corruption, terrorism, etc. However, traditional measures have not obtained the desired results.

Social control is the mechanism of self-organizing and self-preservation of society by the establishment and maintenance of normative order, by elimination, neutralization, or minimization of deviant behavior (including crimes). Two basic methods of social control are encouragement and punishment («bait and switch»).

The social control over criminality includes general methods of social control – punishment, «war on crime» by means of reprisals, and crime prevention. Mankind has tried all means of reprisal, including qualified kinds of death penalty and refined torture. However, criminality for some reason, has not disappeared…

There are some points of view that exists about what inhibis control of crime – «crisis of punishment» (Mathiesen, 1974), crisis of the criminal justice systems, crisis of the criminal-law control over criminality, including the control of police (Christie, 1981; Davis and Anderson, 1983; Pep-inski and Quinney, 1991; Hendrics and Byer, 1996; Rotwax, 1996; Christie, 2000, and others). Movement of abolitionism develops and grows towards cancellation not only of the death penalty, but also towards replacement of imprisonment by alternative measures of punishment, for transition from the retributive justice to the restorative justice (Morris, 1989; Zehr, 1990; Consedine, 1995; and others).

R. Lenoir (1974) and S. Paugam (1996), N. Luhmann (1998) and J. Young (1999) wrote about the new social global situation – the tendency to divide people and societies into inclusive and exclusive. «Inclusive» is the personality inclusive in the functional system. «Exclusive» can be only individual not inclusive in the functional system, who are known only by existence (Luh-mann). The distinction of inclusion/exclusion exist between countries (global inclusion/exclusion) and between people within some countries (national inclusion / exclusion).

From our point of view, the social and economic inequality is one of the biggest criminogenic factors. People have real opportunities to satisfy their needs, depending on their belonging to one or the other social class, stratum, and group or depending on their social and economic status. Inequality of opportunity generates social conflict, dissatisfaction, envy, and at last, various forms of deviation. The process of inclusion/exclusion is acquiring more and more criminogenic and deviantogenic significance, both for the contemporary world and for the future. It is clear that «excluded people» are becoming a mass reserve, a social basis of social deviation, including criminality.

Repressive social control is the best means of exclusion, especially through the issue of selection in the police and the judiciary. There appears to be a cir-culus vitiosus (vicious circle). The repressive mode of social control enhances the amount of the excluded people. The more people are excluded, the higher the deviance (including crime) rate seems to be. The higher the rate of deviance, the more repressive the social control is considered to be.

The basic tendencies of the theory (and in the practice of some countries) of the modern Western policy of the social control over criminality are as follows:

• Recognition of irrationality and inefficiency of the reprisals («crisis of punishment»),

• Change of the strategy of social control from «war» to «peace» and «peacemaking» (Pepinski and Quinney).

• Search for alternative (non-repressive) measures of social reaction.

• Priority of crime prevention (for our opinion about crime prevention see: Gilinskiy, 1998).

• Realization of the conceptof «restorative justice».

• Realization of the concept of «community policing».

The interrelation between the police and the population is old («eternal») and is a complicated problem. The centuries old experience shows that these relations between the police and the public a not friendly and ideal. The increase of crimes after the World War II, «fear of crime» and «moral panic» activate the search for effective methods and means of social control over crime. One of the strategies developed is community policing (Kury, 1997; Lab, Das, 2003; Skogan, Hartnett, 1997). The notion of community policing is not very easy. It has many definitions (Lab, Das, 2003: 4-9). The main idea of «community policing» is the partnership and, cooperation between the police and the community (population, citizens) for better crime prevention. The police render service to citizens (tax-payers). It is a pity, that the partnership between the Russian «Militia» and the community is an illusion in contemporary Russia.

The real strategy of criminal policy is absent in Russia. There are some de jure programs, but there are not really operational without the financing, mechanism for realization. Unfortunately, de facto crime control is still dominated by repressive approaches in contemporary Russia.

The current punishment system in Russia stipulates the following types of criminal punishment: the death penalty (Art. 59 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, 1996 – CC RF); life imprisonment (Art. 57); deprivation of freedom (Art. 56); limitation of freedom (up to 5 years, Art. 53); arrest (up to 6 months, Art. 54); corrective labor (up to 2 years, Art. 50); compulsory labor (up to 240 hours, Art. 49); fines (Art. 46); deprivation of the right to hold a certain position or to conduct certain activities (up to 5 years, Art. 47); confiscation of property (Art. 52); and the deprivation of military or special titles (Art. 48). In addition, military personnel may be sentenced to serve in special disciplinary units (up to 2 years, Art. 55) and there are various compulsory measures of education and supervision for minors (14-17 years, Art. 90).

The last Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (CC RF) from 1996 contains very severe kinds of punishment: death penalty, life imprisonment, and deprivation of freedom for 20 years. In no other previous Criminal Codes of Russia, including during Stalin's period, were there any sanctions like life imprisonment, up to 30 years. Moreover, some kinds of probation and parole (deprivation of freedom with suspended sentence) have been excluded from the new CC RF. In fact, the last amendments to the Criminal Code (December, 2003) were steps toward liberalization, but a very timid step.

There is a moratorium of the death penalty from 1997, but the Russian Parliament («Duma») does not ratify this.

We see tendency toward cutting down the severity of punishment without the deprivation of freedom in the penal and sentencing practice (table 9) – the quota of corrective labor without deprivation of freedom has decreased (from 26.4 % in 1988 to 5.2 % in 2001) while the quota of fine has decreased (from 16.8 % in 1987 to 6.3 % in 2001).

Table 9. Punishment in Russia (1986-2001)

Source: Crime and Delinquency. Statistical Review. Annual. Moscow: MVD RF, MJ RF.

 

Prison

There are 750 penitentiary institutions (labour settlements), 61 pedagogical colonies (for juvenile offenders), 13 prisons, and 174 jails in 1997 (Zubkov, Kalinin, Sysoev, 1998: 81).

The imprisonment rate per 100,000 population (Table 10) in Russia is the highest in the world (more than 720-730 in 1999, excluding institutions of military justice (Abramkin, 1998; Barclay, Tavares, 2003; Christie, 2000; Conditions of convicts in contemporary Russia, 2003; Walmsley, 2003). One in four adult men in Russia is a former prisoner. The overwhelming portion of the prisoners are not professional criminals, but people who found themselves in prison because they had been in a position of misery, unemployment, and homeless. The conditions in penitentiary institutions are terrible (Abramkin, 1998; Gilinskiy, 1998). Extremely harsh regimes in institutions leading to the deprivation of freedom suffered by those awaiting trial or under conditional sentence, contravene human rights, such as overcrowding in the pre-trial detention centers; compelling inmates to sleep in shifts; bad food; the spread of tuberculosis; torture of those awaiting trial, and under investigation in the «press cells» to procure confessions of guilt; and mass beatings. Life in institution for the deprivation of freedom (prisons and correctional colonies) is unbearable, and the possibilities for «correction» are nil. The correctional outcome is quite the reverse.

Thousands of prisoners die every year from hunger, tuberculosis, and suffocating from the lack of oxygen in overcrowded cells in pre-trial detention centers. More than 2,300 people wich HIV infections, and more than 92 thousands people with tuberculosis were in Russian penitentiary institutions in 1999 The situation in penitentiary institutions has slowly improved after the transfer from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Justice.

Table 10. Prison population in Russia (1989-2001)

Source: Barklay G. & Tavares C, 2003: 22

 

Conclusion

Certainly, contemporary Russian system of the criminal justice and the police are more democratic and more liberal than in Soviet Union. But there are many negative manifestation and tendencies, particularly from 1999-2000. The number and rate of violence is very high, wich is a result of the poor social and economic situation, social and economic inequality, and mass exclusion from the economic system. There are the new waves of organized crime – aspiration to the legalization of criminal activity; transition to legal and semi-legal activity; infiltration to legal business and power structure; the politicization of organized crime; and the criminalization of policy and economy. Russia is going farther and farther along the road to being a criminal state and a criminalized society.

Corruption in contemporary Russia is a product of the political system – a mechanism of the political regime. Wholesale corruption is the most serious Russian problem, because all other Russian problems cannot be solved until the «black market» is eliminated. The criminal justice system is ineffective, fraught with injustice and corruption, and depends of corrupt policy and politicians. Finally, the police and other «powerful structure», including the FSB, are very repressive, undemocratic, and irresponsible.

 

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